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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THF STATE OF UTAH

BLAKE STEVENS CONSTRUCTION
and HARTFORD INSURANCE,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
DWINN A. HENION, Mother of
BARI LYN BLAIR, daughter of
BARRY A. BLAIR, deceased,
and THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF UTAH,

Case No. 19006

Defendants.
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY BRIEF

ARGUMENT
Plaintiffs maintain that the average weekly wage is the
hourly rate multiplied by the hours which would have been
worked for the week had there been no accident.
Ann. § 35-1-75(1) (c).
§

3S-l-75(3)

Utah Code

Defendants argue that Utah Code Ann.

justifies the inclusion of an out-of-town sub-

sistence allowance.

§

35-1-75(3) states:

If none of the methods in subsection (1) will
fairly determine the average weekly wage in a particular case, the commission shall use such other
method as will, based upon facts presented, fairly
determine the employee's average weekly wage.

POINT I
DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENT WAS NOT RAISED BELOW
NOR IS IT SUPPORTED BY THE FINDINGS OF THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION.
The initial problem with defendant's argument is that
neither the defendant nor the Industrial Commission relied on
§

35-1-75(3)

sion.

in the proceedings before the Industrial Commis-

Defendants presented no evidence to show that the

statutory formula did not reflect the decedent's wages, as
was their burden.

Further, the Industrial Commission made no

finding that the statutory formula unfairly reflected the
decedent's wages.
§

Having failed to rely upon or comply with

35-1-75(3) before the Industrial Commission, defendant's

argument should be rejected.
POINT II
BEFORE S 35-1-75(3) CAN BE APPLIED, THE
OUT-OF-TOWt' SUBS I S'IENCE ALLOl'1ANCE MUST
QUALIFY AS "WAGES".
Defendants suggest that under S 35-1-75 (3)

the Industrial

Commission has discretion to determine what is "fair" in
light of "a child who will never see her father."
Defendants, pp. 5, 14.

Brief of

Though this is certainly a hardship

for the child,

it is not a factor in determining the dece-

dent's wages.

Nor is the proper test a question of what the

Industrial Commission determines is fair.

-2-

As noted in Crai.2_.

L·•·

Produce v. Industrial Commission, 657 P.2d 1354 (Utah

J"HJ),

the test where the statutory formula does not properly

reflect wages is what method "fairly determine[s]
employee's weekly wage."
now he argued,

the injured

Even assuming that § 35-1-75(3) can

its application must rest upon a determination

that an out-of-town subsistence allowance is wages.
POINT III
THE DETERMINATION WHETHER AN OUT-OF-TOWN
SUBSISTENCE ALLOWANCE IS WAGES REQUIRES A
REVIEW OF THE COMMON DEFINITION OF WAGES.
Defendants argue that it is minimally useful to look at
the common definition of "wages" since § 35-1-75 specifically
defines "wages" by formula.

Brief of Defendants, p. 8.

If

this is true, there is no need to look past the statutory
formula which defendants now challenge as unfair.

And if it

is not true, against what standard can defendants claim unfairness if not the common definition of wages.

Defendant's

recent reliance on a fairness argument belies their claim
that the common definition of "wages" is irrelevant.
Furthermore, an examination of Section 75 mandates a
resort to the common definition of wages.
and

Subsections (1)

(2) define "average weekly wages" through various

rurmulas.

Under § 35-1-75 (3), this average weekly wage

stands unless it "will not fairly determine the average

-3-

weekly wage."

§

35-1-75 (3).

This definition is circular ,;.,

non-sensical unless the common definition of wages is applie0
under § 35-1-75 (3).

Defendants must accept the wage formula

or resort to the common definition of "wages".
POINT IV
A SUBSISTENCE ALLOWAKCE IS NOT "WAGES".
Defendants have not claimed that the common definition of
"wages" offered by plaintiffs is incorrect.

However, they

suggest that an out-of-town subsistence allowances falls
within that definition since the employer agreed to pay it
and could be compelled to do so in a court of law.
Defendants, p. 8.

Brief of

In so arguing defendants have not used the

common definition of "wages" but rather have substituted it
with an uncommon one, that whatever an employer agrees to
give an employee is wages whether it is given for work performed or expenses incurred in the course of employment.
Under defendant's approach, reimbursements or allowances by
an employer for tools and uniforms would qualify as wages.
As explained in plaintiff's Brief, although wages and subsistences allowances are an employer's cost of doing business, a subsistence allowance is not compensation for work
but rather payment to cover expenses incurred because of the
work.

It ends when the expenses end.

paid so long as the work is performed.
-4-

Wages continue to be

1·11

-,1

[s common distinction between waqes and subsistence

:u1-1ances is further illustrated by their income tax treat-

111Pnt.

Under Internal Revenue Code § 61 (1954 as amended)

hoth wages and subsistence allowances are "income".

However,

"expenses paid or incurred in connection with the performance
of services by the taxpayer as an employee under a reimbursement or other expense allowance arrangement with his employer" are a deduction for arriving at the adjusted gross
income.

Internal Revenue Code § 62 (c) (2)

(1954 as amended).

The net result is that a subsistence allowance used as intended is not earnings or wages.
This same distinction is even more clearly drawn in the
treatment of the federal withholding tax on wages and the
social security tax.
subsistence allowance.

Neither tax applies to an out-of-town
In Central Illinois Public Service

Company v. United States, 435 U.S. 21, 55 L.Ed.2d 82, 98
s.ct. 917

(1978), the government claimed that a $1.40 allow-

ance paid to employees for lunch while on authorized travel
wAs wages.

The Supreme Court rejected the government's posi-

tion and found that under a broad definition of "wages" in
the tax law, an allowance to cover employment related expenses was not a wage.

-5-

As commonly understood, a subsistence allowance for
out-of-town work is not payment for labor and therefore,
cannot be considered wages.
Defendants cite several cases to support their claim th 2 t
an out-of-town subsistence allowance is wages.

A review of

these cases either shows the contrary or a rejection of the
rule cited by Larson and espoused by the Industrial Commission.
In Matlock v. Industrial Commission, 70 Ariz. 25, 215
P.2d 612

(1950), a ranch hand received "$125 per month plus a

house, utilities, milk, butter, eggs and meat whenever cattle
were slaughtered, for
dren."

[himself], his wife and three chil-

Without the issue being raised, the court treated

these items as compensation for labor and included them in
the wage computation.

Unlike Matlock, the decedent did not

receive his subsistence
out-of-town.

except when he worked

Nor was it meant to cover the woman with whom

he was living or any children.

It was not intended as com-

pensation for labor but as an allowance for employment
related expenses.
The inapplicability of Matlock is illustrated by Moorehead v. Industrial Commission, 17 Ariz. App. 96, 495 P.2d 8E6
(1972), as discussed in plaintiff's Brief.

There a travel

allowance for out-of-town work was not considered wages.

-6-

In

1
c1 ,1

with Matlock, the court noted that the extra benefits
were intended to meet expenses "which would con-

""'" substantially unchanged whether Matlock was employed or
not" while Moorehead's travel allowance was to cover "expE11ses which will cease with the cessation of [his] employment."

495 P.2d at 869.

Since the travel allowance was not

intended as compensation for services performed, it was not
wages.
This same distinction applies to Morgan v. Equitable General Insurance Co., 383 So.2d 1067 (La. App. 1980) and Ardoin
v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Co., 134 So.2d 323
(La. App. 1961).

Morgan involved a domestic servant who was

given some meals at work and taxi fare to work.

The court

found that these items were intended as compensation for services.

Ardoin apparently involved a dairy hand who was given

a home and milk.

The court found that these items were in-

tended as compensation for services.

Neither Morgan or

Ardoin presents an out-of-town subsistence allowance to cover
employment related expenses.
Bannister v. Shepherd, 191

s.c.

165, 4 S.E. 2d 7 (1939),

presents the opposite situation of Matlock.

Rather than

living on the ranch like Matlock, Bannister was a truck
who lived on the road.

He received $12.50 salary and

1l 12 per week for board and lodging.

-7-

The court included the

board and lodging as wages since it was intended as compensation for services.

Again, this is not the situation pre-

sented here.
In Cosgriff v. Duluth Fireman's Relief Association, 233
Minn. 233, 46 N.W.2d 250

(1951), the applicant was a fireman

and a member of the Duluth Fireman's Relief Association.

On

behalf of the Association, he attended a conference and was
compensated at $10.00 per day plus railroad expenses.

The

compensation was also to cover his board and lodging.

Based

upon a specific statutory provision, the wages were found to
be $10.00 per day.
cluded.

The railroad reimbursement was not in-

Since there is no such statutory provision in Utah,

the case is inapplicable.
The last two cases cited by defendants apparently represent a rejection of the rule enunciated by Larson.

In

American Surety Co. v. Underwood, 74 S.W. 2d 551 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1934), the applicant was a traveling salesman who was
reimbursed for meals and lodging away from home which the
court found to be wages.

In doing so the court rejected the

reasonable economic gain rule discussed by Larson.
v. G. R. Kinney Co.,

In

Inc., 7 N.Y.S.2d 768 (Sup. Ct. 1938), a

traveling salesman received a salary plus living expenses.
Without discussion, the court found the living expenses to be
earnings.

It appears the court was following a rationale

-8-

1milar to Matlock and Bannister or rejecting the real economic gain rule.
Defendants also make the argument that there is no real
increase in expenses because of out-of-town work.
Defendants, pp. 12, 13.
ence.

Brief of

Such a claim ignores common experi-

Temporary lodging, extra travel and eating out on the

road are all substantially greater than maintaining a household.

Furthermore, decedent was required to do both.

Presumably to bolster this argument, defendants argue
that there is no evidence to show that the decedent ever used
his out-of-town subsistence allowance for out-of-town expenses.

Defendants even suggest that he may have slept in a

tent and brought his food with him.

Such an argument ignores

the burden which was on defendants to show that the out-oftown subsistence allowance was wages.

Furthermore, if the

defendants now rely on a real economic gain argument, it was
their burden to prove that the allowance was that.
failed to carry their burden,

Having

it must be assumed that the

decedent used the allowance to cover his out-of-town employment related expenses as intended.
CONCLUSION

The death benefits must be paid on the basis of wages.
Wages are not whatever is received from the employer but

-9-

rather compensation for services.

Since the out-of-town

subsistence allowance was intended to cover employment
related expenses and not as compensation for services,
inclusion in the death benefits is improper.

its

If a real eco-

nomic gain test is applied, there is no proof by defendants
of such a gain.
The out-of-town subsistence allowance should not be used
in computed death benefits based upon wages.
DATED this 21st day of June, 1983.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
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